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Prior Lien on Rents and Profits Upheld as a 
Method of Financing Repairs-
In re Dep't of Bldgs. * 
[Vol. 65 
Official findings of the New York Legislature in 1962 revealed 
the existence in certain cities of housing conditions which, unless 
immediately corrected, might cause irreparable damage to buildings 
or endanger the life, health and safety of their occupants or the 
general public.1 To facilitate the correction of these conditions and 
to increase the supply of adequate, safe dwelling units, the legisla-
ture enacted the 1962 Receivership Law,2 which creates a procedure 
enabling a city to enforce its housing codes by compelling needed 
repairs and improvements. 
Under the 1962 law, whenever the department of real estate 
certifies the existence in a multiple dwelling of a nuisance8 consti-
• 14 N.Y.2d 291, 200 N.E.2d 432 (1964). 
1. N.Y. SESS. LAws, ch. 492, § I (McKinney 1962). 
2. N.Y. MULT, DWELL, LAw § 309. 
3. "The term 'nuisance' shall be held to embrace public nuisance as known at 
common law or in equity jurisprudence. Whatever is dangerous to human life or 
detrimental to health, and whatever dwelling is overcrowded with occupants or 
is not provided with adequate ingress and egress or is not sufficiently supported, 
ventilated, sewered, drained, cleaned, or lighted in reference to its intended or 
actual use, and whatever renders the air or human food or drink unwholesome, 
are also severally, in contemplation of this law, nuisances." N.Y. MuLT. DWEI.L, LAW 
§ 309(l)(a). 
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tuting a serious fire hazard or threat to life or safety, the department 
may issue a written order to the owner directing the elimination 
of the nuisance within a specified time.4 Should the department feel 
that a receiver must be appointed to carry out its order, every mort-
gagee and lienor of record must be sent a copy of the order within 
five days of service upon the owner, along with notice that, in the 
event the nuisance is not properly removed, the department may 
apply to the supreme court for an order to show cause why a re-
ceiver should not be appointed.5 Upon application by the depart-
ment, the supreme court may appoint a receiver who will be given 
a prior lien on the rents and profits of the property to secure pay-
ment for the expenses incurred in removing the nuisance.6 Alter-
natively, if any owner, mortgagee, lienor, or other person having 
an interest in the property applies for permission to repair the 
premises, the court may authorize that person to remove the nuisance 
within a specified time and give the person a lien equivalent to 
the lien that would have been granted to the receiver.7 
The constitutionality of the 1962 Receivership Law was recently 
challenged in In re Dep't of Bldgs.,8 where a receiver was appointed 
and a prior lien created on rents and profits despite the existence 
of a mortgage entered into prior to the enactment of the law. The 
New York Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court order and held 
the statute constitutional.9 
Housing code enforcement constitutes an interference with 
vested property and contract rights. Due process therefore requires 
that those affected be given adequate notice of any order involving 
their interests and a fair hearing in which to contest the legality or 
propriety of the order.10 The 1937 amendment to New York's Mul-
tiple Dwelling Law11 was held unconstitutional by the court of ap-
peals in Central Savings Bank v. City of New York;12 unlike that 
provision, however, the 1962 Receivership Law fully protects the 
procedural rights of the persons affected. Given no chance to con-
test the determination of the existence of a nuisance under the 1937 
law, the owner and mortgagee now are afforded full opportunity 
4. N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LA.w § 309(l)(e). 
5. N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LA.w § 309(5)(a). 
6. N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LA.w §§ 309(5)(c)(3), 309(5)(e). A mortgagee may foreclose 
prior to payment of the receiver's lien but he is not entitled to possession, rents or 
profits until the receiver's claim is satisfied. 
7. N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW §§ 309(5)(g), 309(5)(c)(3). 
8. In re Dep't of Bldgs., 20 App. Div. 2d 851, 248 N.Y.S.2d 199 (1964). 
9. 14 N.Y.2d 291, 200 N.E.2d 432, 251 N.Y.S.2d 441 (1964). 
10. E.g., Southern Ry. v. Virginia, 290 U.S. 190 (1933); Thain v. City of Palo 
Alto, 207 Cal. App. 2d 173, 24 Cal. Rptr. 515 (1962); Chicago, M., &: St. P. Ry. v. 
Board of Comm'rs, 76 Mont. 305, 247 Pac. 162 (1926); See New York v. Gebhardt, 
151 F.2d 802 (2d Cir. 1945). 
11. Laws of N.Y., 1937, ch. 353, § 2. 
12. 279 N.Y. 266, 18 N.E.2d 151 (1938), cert. denied, 306 U.S. 661 (1939). 
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at a fair hearing before the supreme court to introduce any facts 
challenging the department's certification that the property in ques-
tion constitutes a public nuisance.13 Whereas a mortgagee or lienor 
had no opportunity to intervene on his own behalf under the earlier 
law, now it is possible for him to protect his interest by making the 
repairs himself, receiving the lien to secure payment of his expenses.14 
In addition, where the owner and mortgagee were conclusively 
bound by the amount of the lien filed against the property under 
the 1937 law,15 they now have the opportunity to contest the reason-
ableness of the expenses reflected in the lien.16 
Since the 1962 Receivership Law provides for the creation of 
liens on rents and profits which will have priority over existing 
mortgages, the owner and mortgagee in In re Dep't of Bldgs. relied 
upon Central Savings, arguing that the 1962 law was unconstitu-
tional as an impairment of contract rights. Although the contracts 
clause17 prohibits state impairment of contract rights, all contracts 
are subject to the reasonable exercise of the states' police power.18 
As a general rule, a statute will be upheld so long as it bears a sub-
stantial relationship to public health, safety, or morals and is reason-
ably adapted to meeting the exigencies that occasioned its enact-
ment.19 Thus, statutes enacted to meet conditions constituting a 
public emergency have regularly been upheld as proper exercises 
of the police power.20 In 1962 the New York legislature made it 
abundantly clear that, in its opinion, the shortage of adequate, safe 
housing in certain New York cities constituted a public emergency.21 
Conditions in New York City provide dramatic support for the 
legislature's conclusion. Between 1950 and 1960 the city's population 
increased by 2,802,876 persons but only 324,651 additional housing 
units were constructed.22 In 1960, of the city's 2,758,116 housing 
13. N.Y. MuLT. DWELL. LAW § 309(5)(c)(3). 
14. N.Y. MuLT. DWELL. LAw §§ 309(5)(c)(3), 309(5)(g); see text accompanying note 
6 supra. 
15. Laws of N.Y., 1937, ch. 353, § 3(6)(g). 
16. N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW § 309(4)(d). 
17. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 10. 
18. See, e.g., Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934): Marcus 
Brown Co. v. Feldman, 256 U.S. 170 (1921); Taylor v. Brown, 137 F.2d 654 (Emerg. 
Ct. App.) cert. denied, 320 U.S. 787 (1943); Loring v. Commissioner of Pub. Works, 
264 Mass. 460, 163 N.E. 82 (1928). 
19. See Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, supra note 18. 
20. See, e.g., Honeyman v. Jacobs, 306 U.S. 539 (1939); Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n 
v. Blaisdell, supra note 18; Marcus Brown Co. v. Feldman, 256 U.S. 170 (1921); 
Loab Estates Inc. v. Druhe, 300 N.Y. 176, 90 N.E.2d 25 (1949); People ex rel. Durham 
Realty Corp. v. La Fetra, 230, N.Y. 429, 130 N.E. 601 (1921) (landlords not permitted 
to evict tenants during a housing shortage even after expiration of leases). 
21. N.Y. SESS. LAws, ch. 492, § 1 (McKinney 1962). 
22. UNITED STATES DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CENSUS OF POPULATION AND HOUSING-
CENSUS TRACT 104, 1960, p. 752. "A house, an apartment or other group of rooms, or 
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units, 84,246 were in dilapidated condition and 343,311 were in 
deteriorating condition; 30,303 units were without heating, 19,468 
were without hot water, 198,395 units shared bathrooms or had none 
at all, and 172,259 lacked other plumbing facilities.23 In view of 
these circumstances, the court justifiably concluded that the 1962 
Receivership Law, providing a technique which could be used both 
to facilitate the immediate repair of substandard dwellings and to 
preserve the physical standards of sound neighborhoods, is a per-
missible exercise of the state's police power. Central Savings was 
properly distinguished on the ground that the conditions which 
confronted the legislature in 1962 were far more serious than those 
which existed in 1937.24 
The court was also correct in distinguishing the Central Savings 
case on the additional ground that the impairment of contracts 
under the 1937 law was more severe than under the 1962 law, and 
consequently the state's exercise of the police power was less reason-
able in 1937.211 By creating a lien with a limited rather than an 
absolute priority, the legislature avoided one of the features that 
had led the Central Savings court to hold the 1937 paramount lien 
provision an unconstitutional impairment of contracts.26 Under the 
1937 legislation the receiver was given the right to foreclose his 
paramount lien, possibly wiping out the mortgagee's interest com-
pletely.27 Under the new legislation the lien attaches not to the fee 
itself but only to the rents and profits.28 The mortgagee's interest 
can thus be postponed but not eliminated. 
The 1962 Receivership Law represents a significant development 
in the urban renewal field. The complex task of renewing major 
a single room is regarded as a housing unit when it is occupied or intended for 
occupancy as separate living quarters, that is, when the occupants do not live 
and eat with any other persons in the structure and there is either (1) direct access 
from the outside or through a common hall or (2) kitchen or cooking equipment 
for the exclusive use of the occupants of the unit." Id. at 5. 
2!!. "Deteriorated housing needs more repair than would be provided in the 
course of regular maintenance. It has one or more defects of an intermediate nature 
that must be corrected if the unit is to continue to provide safe and adequate 
shelter. Dilapidated housing does not provide safe and adequate shelter. It has one 
or more critical defects, or has a combination of intermediate defects in sufficient 
number to require extensive repair or rebuilding, or is of inadequate original con• 
struction. Critical defects result from continued neglect or lack of repair or indicate 
serious damage to the structure .•.. " Id. at 6. 
24. 14 N.Y.2d 291, 251 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1964). 
25. Ibid. 
26. 279 N.Y. 226, 18 N.E.2d 151 (1938). 
27. "Every such assessment ..• shall be a lien or charge upon the property 
or premises ••• which lien shall have priority over all other liens and encumbrances, 
including mortgages whether or not recorded previously to the levying of such 
assessment .••. " Laws of New York, 1937, ch. 353, § 3(6)(g). 
28. N.Y. MuLT. DwELL. LAw § 309(5)(e). 
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cities cannot be accomplished by clearance and redevelopment alone. 
Although clearance and redevelopment is effective in eliminating 
small pockets of slums, it is extremely expensive and does nothing 
to prevent the growth of new slum areas.29 As a result, the success 
of the urban renewal effort depends upon effective conservation and 
rehabilitation programs aimed at preserving and restoring existing 
neighborhoods.30 Essential to the success of a conservation and re-
habilitation program is firm and vigorous enforcement of housing 
codes. These codes, however, have not been stringently enforced be-
cause of ineffective administration and a lack of adequate sanc-
tions.31 In some cities, fines or even jail sentences result when repair 
orders are violated, 32 but owners frequently treat the fines as a cost 
of doing business, preferring the risk of a fine to the expense of 
making repairs.33 Code provisions requiring vacation of substandard 
dwellings until repairs are made34 have proved ineffective because 
many owners would rather vacate than make the required repairs. 
The result is boarded-up dwellings which accentuate the decline of 
the neighborhood and decrease the supply of adequate low-rent 
housing.35 Some municipal ordinances permit the city to make 
needed repairs and to place a subordinate lien on the property for 
the cost.36 This approach also has been ineffective since the city 
often does not recover the cost of repair because the property is al-
ready mortgaged in excess of its value.37 
In light of past failures to enforce housing codes adequately, 
29. It has been estimated that ,the total cost to redevelop the residential slums 
and blighted areas in the United States would be 85.5 billion dollars. DEWHURST, 
AMERICAN NEEDS AND REsoURCES 511-12 (1955). See generally JOHNSON, MORRIS, &: Burrs, 
RENEWING AMERICA'S CITIES 76-103 (1962); Siegel, Slum Prevention-A Public Purpose, 
35 CHICAGO B. RECORD 151 (1954); Note, 72 HARV. L. REv. 504 (1959). 
30. See NEW YORK CITY PLANNING COMMISSION, URBAN RENEWAL (1958); PRESIDENT'S 
ADVISORY COMM. ON GOVERNMENT HOUSING PouCIES AND PROGRAMS, REPORT TO THE 
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES (1953); Guandolo, Housing Codes in Urban Renewal, 
25 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1 (1956); Osgood &: Zwemer, Rehabilitation & Conservation, 
25 LAw &: CoNTEMP. PROB. 705 (1960). See generally Comment, Conseroation and 
Rehabilitation of Housing-An Idea Approaches Adolescence, 63 MICH. L. REv. 892 
(1965). 
31. See Note, 78 HARV. L. REV. 801 (1965); Note, 72 HARV. L. REV. 504 (1959). 
32. See, e.g., Sarasota, Fla., Ordinance No. 827, § 11 (1954); NEW HAVEN, CONN., 
HOUSING CODE 1f 102 (1962); WASHINGTON, D.C., HOUSING REGULATIONS § 2104 (1962); 
PHILADELPHIA, PA., GENERAL ORDINANCES § 7-104 (1956), as amended, March 31, 1964; 
CHICAGO, ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE§ 39-4 (1963). See Note, 78 HARv. L. REV. 801, 820 (1965). 
33. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 28, 1955, p. 33, cols. 3-4. 
34. See, e.g., CHICAGO ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 39-12 (1963); Houston, Tex., Ordinance 
No. 9354, §§ 7-9 (1953); see 69 HARV. L. REv. 1115, 1123 (1956). 
35. See 69 HARV. L. REv. 1115 (1956). 
36. See People ex rel. Gutknecht v. Chicago, 3 Ill. 2d 539, 121 N.E.2d 791 (1954). 
See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. §§ 40:561-72 (1950); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160-184 (1964); s.c. 
CODE ANN. § 36-502 (1962); TENN. CODE ANN. § 13-1203 (1955). 
37. See Note, 72 HARv. L. REv. 504 (1959). 
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New York's 1962 law represents an important step forward. The law, 
however, does have shortcomings.38 Generally, the appointment of a 
receiver is a time-consuming process because of the numerous pro-
cedural safeguards built into the statute.39 Furthermore, utilization 
of a city agency as receiver may put severe strains on public financial 
resources, thus reducing the number of dwellings repaired and cur-
tailing vigorous prosecution of the program. In addition, political 
expediency may demand that only buildings in the poorest state of 
repair be included in the receivership program, so as to provide 
immediately noticeable improvements. Inherent in such a situation, 
moreover, is the possibility that the repairs may be so costly that 
rental income during the useful life of the building will not be 
sufficient to pay for the renovations; the receivership may then 
amount to little more than a disguised subsidy. An increase in the 
rental rates to eliminate the subsidy, however, would tend to dis-
place low-income tenants, thus defeating in large part the goals of 
the urban renewal program.40 
Since most of the above shortcomings can be avoided if the re-
ceivership program is well administered, the advantages of the 1962 
Receivership Law seem to outweigh its possible deficiencies. Fur-
thermore, as the Housing Act of 1964 has made federal funds avail-
able to aid municipalities in financing code enforcement,41 it is to 
be expected that more thorough inspections will uncover more code 
violation than heretofore. Strict code enforcement, employing the 
sanctions of the 1962 Receivership Law, is likely to produce wider 
voluntary compliance, thereby creating an atmosphere of improve-
ment rather than of decline.42 It is to be hoped that this will restore 
the confidence of private investors and attract new capital to 
declining areas.43 Since prior liens can serve as an effective additional 
tool in a comprehensive conservation and rehabilitation program, it 
is hoped that similar laws will be enacted in other jurisdictions where 
emergency conditions warrant use of the police power. 
!18. See generally Note, 78 HARv. L. REY. 801, 828-!IO (1965). 
!19. See text accompanying notes 1!1-16 supra. 
40. Notwithstanding these potential shortcomings, the Deputy Commissioner of 
New York City's Department of Buildings speaks of the Receivership Law in en-
thusiastic terms: "Receivership is an essential and primary code enforcement weapon. 
• • • Unlike other available remedies, receivership provides a means of assuring, as 
an end product, total or substantial code enforcement. . • • [It] is the only legal 
weapon that generates activity by all parties who have an interest in the property . 
• • • For the first time we possess a tool which can assure the repair of dilapidated 
structures." Gribetz, New York City's Receivership Law, 21 J. Hous1NG 297-300 (1964). 
41. Housing Act of 1964, § 30l(b), 78 Stat. 785, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1460(c), 1453(a)(2)(A) 
(1964). 
42. Gribetz, supra note 40, at 300. 
43. NEW YORK CITY PLANNING COMMISSION, URBAN RENEWAL (1958). 
